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ABSTRACT: In this paper, we compare Heidegger and Sellars’ respective responses to Kant’s 
Schematism section of the Transcendental Analytic, taking heed of how both philosophers 
motivate a criticism of representationalism in their respective renderings while also prodding 
their Kantian insights towards a holist conception of normativity. We begin with an overview 
and analysis of Heidegger and Sellars’ holism, comparing both thinkers’ systematic thought. We 
then turn to how both appraise Kant' Schematism section, first working through Heidegger’s 
analysis of Kant’s understanding and imagination. We follow this up with Sellars’ naturalized 
Kantianism, taking particular interest in how Sellars emphasizes the basic foundational units, 
i.e., ‘this-suches’, grounding Kant’s theory of perception. We appraise both approaches, making 
the case that they offer a compatible productive misreading.  
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I 
In this paper, we will compare Heidegger and Sellars’ responses to Kant’s conception of 
imagination and understanding as delineated in the Schematism section of the 
Transcendental Analytic. This paper will motivate a critique of representationalism by 
drawing from complementary critiques offered by Heidegger and Sellars, eventually 
theorizing a naturalized Kantian framework. We will begin by first justifying our project, 
which takes up Heidegger and Sellars as somewhat compatible and complementary 
thinkers, while also underscoring the significant points of departure between the two. 
We will then review Kant’s Schematism section before taking up how Heidegger and 
Sellars appraise it, concluding with a post-Kantian framework that synthesizes 
Heidegger and Sellars’ critiques.  
Let us here clarify what, exactly, we mean by representationalism. 
Representationalism can mean that what it is for a subject to have a state with a certain 
phenomenal character is for that state to have a certain representational content. 
According to this account, if a person occurrently believes/judges some state of affairs 
to be the case, then their believing has high epistemic worth. This belief is thus non-
inferentially warranted and self-evident. According to the thesis of representationalism, 
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mental qualities represent intentional qualities, on which perceptible properties are 
represented solely by way of intentional content. Therein, the representationalist takes 
all introspectable qualitative aspects of a conscious experience as qualities that the 
experience non-conceptually represents the world to have.  
It is well known that Kant problematizes direct realist representational theories of 
perception according to which the direct objects of our awareness are mental 
representations, wherein these mental representations are typically caused by objects in 
our surroundings and which—in cases of veridical perception—represent the actual 
characteristics of those objects (Westphal 2020: 135). How, then, is the self-ascription of 
sensory experiences possible if not through knowledge of direct sensorial acquaintance 
with objects of perception? For Kant, answering this question requires that judgments in 
experience do not treat empirical sense-data as objectively representing some mind-
independent represented. As is well known, for Kant any representational state which 
provides one with the awareness of a plurality of sensory ideas or experiences involves 
judgments in experience. And according to Kant's transcendental philosophy, 
experience (Erfahrung) is a kind of empirical cognition (empirische Erkenntnis). Specifically, 
experience consists in sensation-based judgments about an object or an objective reality 
(Prolegomena §18). Experience thus results from the mind's activity of bringing a multitude 
of sensations under empirical concepts, and of therein combining those concepts into 
judgments (KrV B165-6). The two main faculties involved in experience for Kant are the 
faculty of sensibility and the understanding as the faculty to judge. Sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) 
immediately relates to objects and yields sensory intuitions (Anschauungen) of these objects 
according to the forms of space and time. The understanding (Verstand) applies general 
concepts (Begriffe) and yields judgments (Urteile) about objects of experience in accordance 
with its basic forms, the categories (e.g., unity, substance, causality). Perceptual 
experience thus requires perceptual synthesis of sensory intake, but sensations/sensory 
intake cannot alone account for synthesis. Kant’s positive thesis hence entails that the 
understanding comes to play in perception, as the apprehension of intuition into 
empirical consciousness requires a mental activity of synthesis. Synthesis cannot be 
accomplished by passive faculties that simply receive data, as synthesis requires active 
faculties that bring for the representations—the imagination and understanding. 
Kant hence indicates a significant advance over representationalism, as Kant’s 
transcendental method rejects any alleged “transparency of consciousness.” This so-
called “transparency argument” is often taken to originate in Descartes, but still finds 
defenders in contemporary philosophy of mind (Tye 1997). So-called “strong 
representationalists” appeal to “transparency”, or diaphanousness, to argue that there is 
nothing more that we are aware of in having world-directed experiences than the objects 
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and properties we putatively perceive.  According to this line of thinking, someone seeing 
a tree has no access at all to the intrinsic features of their mental representation that 
make it a mere representation of seeing a tree. Thus, in recognizing the distinctive 
contributions of sensation and judgment in perceptual experience, Kant reconceives 
sensations no longer as Cartesian/Humean objects of awareness but as components of 
awareness (Westphal 2020: 142). And in cases of veridical perception, we are aware of 
spatio-temporal particulars via our integrated sensory and judgmental acts of perceiving 
them. As such, our 'direct' perception of objects in our surroundings is a complex 
achievement requiring the integration of both sensory and intellectual factors.  
Contra British empiricism, Kant's critique of representationalism hence illuminates 
a problem beyond simple givenness of sense-data. As noted, Kant’s account demonstrates 
that representationalist accounts of sensory ideas tend to assume that if a sensory idea 
was caused by an object, that idea also represented some feature of that object. But, 
under Heideggerian lights, representationalism is criticized once again, albeit in different 
form. This time the culprit is Husserl, for whom only once our so-called ‘natural attitude’ 
is ‘suspended’ and undergoes a phenomenological reduction, does the phenomenologist 
gain access to the general structure of intentionality. For Husserl, this reduction allows 
the phenomenologist to include the ontological structure of the objects of experience. In 
motivating his ‘bracketing’ method of phenomenological reflection, Husserl thought it 
possible to understand the nature and content of perception by way of an independent 
perspective divorced from perceptual reference to the physical environment. Insofar as 
the Husserlian ‘bracketing’ of the ‘natural stance’ seeks to decant itself of the residual 
metaphysical inflation of the Cartesian ego as res cogitans, the content of perception, on 
this view, can be fully comprehended while remaining indifferent towards 
elements/spatio-temporal particulars in the physical environment.  
Indeed, Husserl, himself, had rejected a certain strip of reductive givenness rejecting 
in particular the notion that patterns of association of sensory qualia, or specific 
inferences which comprise those patterns, provide objective meaning there is. Similarly, 
Husserl rejected the ‘intellectualist’ approach which holds the intellectual capacity for 
judgment or propositional inference is what confers objectivity. Husserl’s alternative was 
to proffer objectivity bestowing acts by distinguishing between perception and 
propositional attitudes, where some of these objectivity-bestowing acts are 
subpropositional and others are ‘immanent’ within perception. In untethering 
perception from propositional attitudes, Husserl conceives of so-called ‘noematic’ acts 
which underlie perception and judgment. These noematic acts thought of objectivity as 
to be derived from idealized events—i.e., ‘transcendental’ acts—accessible to an agent 
via phenomenological reflection, where reflection could yield ‘essences’, objective 
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structures, and idealized acts (1913: § 41-55; 85-90; 94-97, 101-131, 150-151). 
Nevertheless, what Husserl’s method shared with the British sense-data theorists 
inspired by Russell’s sense-data simples was to avoid looking at the contents of an 
individual’s mind and psychology. Indeed, “[t]he point here is not just that Husserl takes 
up a first-person point of view on perceptual contents is that he construes those contents 
as not already implicating reference and attribution to the physical environment. In this 
respect, Husserl’s conception of perception is very like that of the phenomenalist/sense-
data-theorists inspired by Russell” (Burge 2010: 131). And while Husserl’s account does 
move beyond transparency/diaphanousness, it also forges a correlation between noesis-
noema, which is taken to be foundational in relation to empirical knowledge concerning 
the external world.  Moving beyond Husserl’s phenomenological ‘reduction’ of the 
‘natural attitude,’ Heidegger asks whether enquiry into the subject's cognitive access to 
the world of phenomena shrouds more fundamental forms of intentional disclosure than 
representation, targeting the ontological practice that uncritically carried over 
metaphysical prejudices since the Greek origins of philosophy. The “existential analytic 
of Dasein” which sets off the project of Sein und Zeit is thus formulated not in terms of a 
transcendental epistemology, but rather as a fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontology 
necessitates a means of disclosing how one person can perceive their world in one mode 
and a different person perceive their world in a wholly distinct manner.  
Heidegger’s project retrieves thus problematizes the subject-object dichotomy 
reiterated in Husserl, setting out to investigate more primordial forms of intentional 
“comportments” (Verhalten) that characterize our being-in-the-world. In doing so, 
Heidegger typologizes our being-in-the-world, describing how, in relation to the future-
oriented modalities of engaged practice (“readiness-to-hand,” Zuhandenheit), objective 
cognition (“presence-at-hand,” Vorhandenheit) appears but as a derivative mode of 
intentionality. For Heidegger, structures of being-in-the-world as involvement in 
practical concerns, future-directedness, and situatedness are hence taken as "more 
primordial" (ursprunglich) than theoretical reflection. Whereas theorizing might be 
derivative from being-in-the- world, practical activities cannot be accounted for in terms 
of the representationalist picture assumed by the theoretical attitude (Guignon 1990: 231).  
Lastly Sellars famously challenges a specific version of representationalism which 
takes the form of sense-data inference. Sense-data inference states that: 
x looks θ  
therefore, something is θ (Chisholm 1950, 173).1 
 
1 As David Papineau notes, sense-datum theorists explain all sensory experiences not in terms 
of ordinary sensory perception of ordinary material objects, but as involving the special 
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However, Sellars goes further than simply challenging sense-datum theories. 
Indeed—and as is well documented from their published debates and correspondence—
Sellars’ position is poised contra Chisholm’s so-called ‘adverbialist’ view, which holds 
that sensory experiences are constituted by modifications of the conscious properties of 
subjects; according to an adverbialist, to visually experience a red ball is to visually 
experience in a red-ball-like manner. Following the adverbialist framework, sensory 
experiences are simply qualitative conscious properties that do not relate their subjects 
to any further objects beyond themselves. Adverbialists like Chisholm further stipulate 
that we should equate any talk of ‘seeing a red ball’ with such adverbial descriptions as 
‘visually experiencing redly and roundly’. Sellars detects ‘givennist’ foundationalism in 
those who espouse a direct apprehension account of self-presentingness, according to 
which in the case of perception it is the fact that-p which directly justifies one’s non-
inferential perceptual belief (and verbal report) that-p. In response, Sellars argues that 
sensations themselves are not objects of self-conscious awareness—instead they are 
components of awareness, typically particulars in our surroundings (EPM 142). However, 
Sellars’ advancement over representationalism is not simply at the level of conceptual 
content and sense-data. Indeed, Sellars emphasizes a distinction at the level of linguistic 
objects as well. Following Sellars, we must distinguish between two kinds of functional 
roles realized by linguistic behavior. The first are the relations of signification that comprise 
those semantic-inferential proprieties that concepts acquire according to socially 
convened norms of use, as part of a language. The second are the picturing relations 
between discursive items (comprising both the nominal terms of a natural language and 
those model-structures in formal languages) and non-discursive items in the environment 
(comprising the ultimate “truth-makers” of a language or theory; Sellars 1963: 215). 
Sellars emphasizes linguistic objects because language is seen as essential to the uniquely 
human mode of picturing, and not because only languages picture. By bifurcating 
signification from picturing, Sellars seeks to “abandon the presupposition at the core of 
orthodox naturalistic Representationalism, that propositional content and word-natural-
world correspondence live in the same box” (ibid., 170).  In his critique of 
representationalism, Sellars remarks that just as “the generalizations in question do not, 
so to speak, separately relate ‘red’ to red things and ‘man’ to men [but] relate sentential 
expressions containing ‘red’ to red things and sentential expressions containing ‘man’ to 
 
relationship of sensory awareness to facts involving special sense data. However the adverbialists 
of the mid-20th century held that “sensory experiences are constitutionally non-relational” such 
that “[s]ensory experiences are constituted by the way subjects are experiencing, not by any 
relations between subjects and further entities” (2021: 136). 
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men” (Sellars 1979: 70), so “the representational features of an empirical language require 
the presence in the language of a [whole] schematic world story” (128).  
Like Kant and Heidegger, Sellars does not merely critique representationalism but 
also offers a positive thesis in its place. Echoing the late Wittgenstein’s criticisms of St. 
Augustine, Sellars argues that the map of the world that is produced by a language is not 
found sentence by sentence but solely in the entirety of the living language-cum-thought 
“running isomorphic to the whole world” (Millikan in Stekeler-Weithofer 2005: 54). 
Sellars’ positive thesis underscores the role that inference plays in understanding, 
speaking to how the inferential rules we articulate are neither descriptions of regularities 
of human doings nor prescriptions articulating how “human doings should proceed in 
an ‘optimal’ case” (Peregrin in Stekeler-Weithofer 2005: 48). Rather, inferential rules do 
what the rules of chess do—they restrict the possibilities of our doings, hence constituting 
a space for a novel possibilities.2  
We now have a provisional map of how Kant, Heidegger, and Sellars engage with 
the thesis of representationalism and how each moves beyond the specific version of 
representationalism that they problematize. However, in this paper, our interest in not 
in simply observing how the rejection of representationalism transpires in Kant, 
Heidegger, and Sellars, but rather in analyzing how Heidegger and Sellars’ appraisal of 
Kant’s conception of the imagination and understanding motivates both a critique of 
representationalism and lends a positive (post-)Kantian epistemology. Indeed, both 
philosophers (rightly or wrongly) read representationalism into Kant, but in doing so 
prod forth original contributions to our understanding of Kantian epistemology. Our 
survey of Sellars and Heidegger shall not be uncritical—in both cases, as we shall see, 
both collapse Kant’s conception of the imagination with his notion of the understanding. 
Despite some misreadings and uncharitable interpretations can be located in both 
Heidegger and Sellars’ analyses of Kant, by comparing Sellars and Heidegger’s insights 
(and their productive misinterpretations), we will be able to formalize a post-Kantian 
realist-cum-naturalist paradigm which heralds the best insights of both thinkers. 
Before doing so, however, let us consider how Heidegger and Sellars compare with 
one another so as to justify our synthetic project, which involves reading the two thinkers 
together while also qualifying the limits of any such venture. Any project which reads 
two philosophers as compatible thinkers risks eliding the incompatible details, and we 
 
2 These constraints (i.e., “rules of criticism”) are liberating, according to Sellars’ account. Within chess, we 
are allowed to move pieces in a certain way only; and if we respect this, possibilities open up, for example 
the possibility to sacrifice a piece for a strong attack, etc. Within language, when we accept its rules, we can 
move in the space of meaningfulness, within which we can mean various things previously unavailable to 
us, we can communicate with others and think propositionally. 
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must be privy not to gloss over antinomies and antagonisms where they appear. 
Unfortunately, there has been a dearth of scholarship comparing Heidegger and Sellars 
head-on—this is despite the fact that a significant number of scholars working on 
Heidegger in the Anglo tradition are, to some degree, Sellarsians.3 This might suggest 
that the two thinkers share little at best and are wholly incompatible at worst—after all, 
at the most superficial level Sellars’ scientific realism and psychological nominalism has 
little to do with the phenomenology espoused by Heidegger. Nonetheless, there are some 
important points of confluence to take notice of before we consider how the two 
philosophers analyze Kant’s Schematism specifically.  
To begin with, both Sellars and Heidegger stake their projects on our unmediated 
familiarity with worldly entities. Furthermore, neither Sellars nor Heidegger deny the 
existence of “inner” mental or conscious experience, although they both treat inner 
mental events/conscious experiences as freighted upon a more fundamental grasp of 
publicly accessible circumstances. In Heidegger’s account, this comes to bear with 
Dasein’s make-up as being-in-the-world; for Heidegger, Dasein is said to be manifest in 
everyday dealings with equipment and with other sapient beings (SZ 309). With Sellars 
we have the well-known critique of the myth of the given, which makes the case that our 
capacities for epistemic knowledge cannot start with sense/data mere experiential 
presence (EPM §54). For Sellars, any understanding of so-called “inner” appearances—
such as something’s “looking red”—is parasitic on being able to competently grasp 
relevant worldly circumstances (“red”). Comprehending these worldly circumstances 
necessitates that one incorporate grasping how appearances of a publicly accessible 
aspect of the world vary within those circumstances. As Joseph Rouse notes “[i]n the 
case of colors, for example, the relevant circumstances would include lighting, distance, 
viewing angle, and the visual and functional context” (2016). Indeed, Sellars’ 
commitment to methodological behaviorism does not deny the existence of mental 
events/processes, but it does deny them any foundational role. For Sellars, mental 
events/states are theoretical entities which are posited to explicate publicly accessible 
phenomena. Although one can learn to apply the relevant concepts non-inferentially, 
any such non-inferential recognition of mental states is defeasible, contextually situated, 
and first-person-privileged vis-a-vis a default normative status, and also applicable third-
 
3 John Haugeland, Mark Okrent, Robert Brandom, and Joseph Rouse are such examples. 
There is a great deal of interest in Heidegger in the so-called left-wing Sellarsian and “Pittsburgh 
School” camp; this is a natural progression, given the well-documented and analyzed confluence 
between Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Nonetheless, the sole scholarship any of these philosophers 
have produced that directly compares Heidegger and Sellars is Rouse (in press) “What are 
Heidegger and Sellars Up to?” 
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personally without any comparable default standing.  
Hence, Heidegger and Sellars each proffer a central role to the holistic capacity for 
understanding. With Sellars, this is articulated of meaning holism vis-à-vis conceptual 
role semantics (CRS).4 Many CRS theorists stake that understanding the meaning of an 
expression from resources one is not explicitly aware of involves translating this 
expression into an expression constructed from resources one does use (Sellars, 1962; 
Quine, 1953, 1960; Davidson, 1973; Field, 2001).5 For Sellars (1969), specifically, to 
understand intentional states we need an understanding of speech acts in terms of speech 
act meaning; as such, the meanings of expressions of a symbol-system (e.g., a language), 
but also the meanings of contents of mental states, are determined and/or explained by 
the role of the expressions/mental states in thinking. Sellars’ CRS hence commits him 
to rejecting the idea that thoughts have any intrinsic given content which is prior 
to/predates the use of concepts in thought.  
Insofar as Heidegger’s holism and social externalism is concerned, this is evident in 
the social construction of rule-following in Heidegger’s conception of normativity. 
Heidegger’s conception of the normativity of “the they” (das Man) commits him to the idea 
that our attitude contents (beliefs, intentions, etc.) depend essentially on the norms of our 
 
4 According to conceptual role semantics (CRS), the nature of meaning is functional. Jerry 
Fodor famously argued that all concepts are innate on the ground that to learn a word, one must 
learn its definition; according to Fodor, however, there are very few definitions that are anything 
other than translations into another language of the same expressive power; therefore, the 
language of thought must come equipped with translations of most English words (Fodor and 
Lepore 1992). Many have found the conclusion hard to accept, for how could evolution have 
provided us with innate concepts? Thus it is an advantage of CRS that it allows one to overcome 
this argument by opening space for an alternative to (1): one can learn a word by learning to use 
it, independently of any definition. See: 
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/ConceptualRoleSemantics.html. 
Accessed April 10, 2121. 
5 Gilbert Harman notes that:  
This might suggest treating ‘‘‘Nichts’ means nothing” to a first approximation as a 
variant of ‘‘‘Nichts’ is best translated into my system as ‘nothing’.” Let us call proposals 
that try to explain meaning statements (of the form ‘e means m’) in terms of translation 
translational accounts of meaning statements. Various worries might be raised about 
such accounts. It might be objected that the suggested treatment can be shown to fail 
by comparing the translations into French of ‘‘‘Nichts’ means nothing” and ‘‘‘Nichts’ is 
best translated into my system as ‘nothing’’’. Sellars (1962) responds by rephrasing the 
proposal using “dot-quotation,” where “⋅nothing⋅” is used to specify a type of expression 
that can appear in any language, categorized by its use in its language. Field (2001) notes 
that ordinary quotation often functions like Sellars’ dot quotation”. (Harman 2005: 5) 
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social environments (SZ 169). As articulated via Heidegger’s verbiage, “distantiality” is 
understood as Dasein's agitation/discomfort with the way in which it differs from others. 
This differing is what Heidegger terms "distance" (Abstand). Beginning with one’s youth, 
Dasein is concerned with ways in which it differs from others, and Dasein seeks to 
minimize its differentiation from others. This is not always entirely successful, and there 
is deviance. But deviance often finds itself corrected by the normalization of behavior by 
others, which is due to the tendency towards minimizing difference; this creates social 
conformity. These corrections results in the standards to which Dasein is to conform, and 
this upholds measure(s) of differentiation. These corrections come in different 
phenomena (e.g., “distantiality,” “subjection,” “averaging out,” “leveling down”) but the 
general pattern is of normalized comportment, and all the phenomena which constitute 
it make up what Heidegger terms das Man. “The they” is itself a pattern of “comportment,” 
a way of “being-in-the-world”—that is, it is a way in which someone participates in 
normalized practices. Heidegger’s holism is thus social, as for Heidegger participation is 
never some neutral activity, for it always simultaneously both entails living in accordance 
with normalized social norms and enforcing them. “Das man” suggests the impersonality 
of the phenomenon—normalized behavior is not tailored to any one person, but applies 
to all. Like Sellars, Heidegger locates the constitutive conditions of intentionality in the 
world, rather than simply in our heads (Carman 136). However, contra Sellars’ 
naturalism—which is tethered to the analysis of intentional states vis-à-vis (third-person) 
speech acts—Heidegger does not take as granted any specialized descriptions of the 
external world drawn from the natural sciences. Instead, on Heidegger’s account, the 
(social) world has authority over the contents of our intentional attitudes, but this social 
world cannot be reduced to the physical world itself. The social world is understood as 
the world of human customs, institutions, and beliefs as they are made accessible to us 
by our ordinary shared normative standards of intelligibility. 
This is not to suggest that Heidegger’s account is denuded of attention to speech-
acts—quite the opposite. For Heidegger, understanding the being of entities is a 
condition for any and all encounters with entities as entities; thus, Heidegger calls 
understanding an existentiale. And any interpretation of something as something includes 
the linguistic assertions that point out and communicate about entities in any definite 
way, which always presupposes some more fundamental and unexplicated conception of 
understanding. But, indeed, there are substantial differences insofar as understanding 
and language are concerned—first and foremost, Sellars talks about understanding as 
conceptual, whereas Heidegger resists this term. Nonetheless, what is most important is 
that Heidegger and Sellars do both take a holistic capacity to understand the being of 
entities, or to understand things conceptually, as differentiating human beings as sapient 
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beings, distinct from other non-human animals (despite apparent continuities). Consider, 
for instance, that Heidegger (1983/1992) characterizes non-human animal life as “world-
poor”, where “world” amounts to the whole interrelated nexus of significance within 
which various entities and projects make sense. The early Sellars similarly allows that we 
can productively “explain [animal] behavior by ascribing to them beliefs, desires, 
expectations, etc., but, and this is a key point, we invariably find ourselves qualifying 
these explanations in terms which would amount, in the case of a human subject, to the 
admission that he wasn’t really thinking, believing, desiring, etc.” (ITM, 527). The later 
Sellars (1981a) allows for the explanatory attribution of representational structures and 
even propositional attitudes to other animals for the purposes of cognitive science, 
although he nevertheless continues to insist upon a critical distinction between these 
representational systems and those which also have the capacities to use logic so as to 
formulate rules or norms that reflexively govern its own operations (MEV).6 For Sellars, 
these latter systems, and only such systems, are capable of genuinely conceptual thinking.  
Having outlined some points of confluence and difference between Sellars and 
Heidegger’s general systems, we are now prepared to see how they apply their systems 
to Kant’s Schematism. In what follows, we will first work through the Schematism section 
of the Transcendental Analytic, and then consider Heidegger and Sellars approaches. 
We will then conclude by dovetailing their accounts, considering what lessons both 
philosophers’ critical appraisal of Kant might offer for purposing systematic Kantian 
critique of representationalism.  
 
II 
In the Schematism section, Kant describes the correspondence between the forms 
of intuition and the categories of the understanding in accordance with two 
mathematical paradigms, distinguishing between two kinds of “magnitudes” 
(A161/B200). The first is space as the form of “outer sense,” comprising the physical reality 
of objects that affect the mind ‘from without’, measured as extended magnitudes, and 
corresponding to the category of Quantity in the Axioms of  Intuition and made explicit by 
(Euclidean) geometry. The second is time as the form of “inner sense, comprising the 
 
6 Following Sellars’ account in EPM, there are two kinds of nonlinguistic creatures. There 
are some who are not humans, i.e., non-human animals, who are thought by Sellars not to use 
language even if they have some measure of signaling that is communicative and thus something 
that functions analogous to language. The other kind of nonlinguistic creature is a human being 
at a very young age. For Sellars, people are not born, much less conceived, as having language-
use. Language has to be learned, and the kind of creatures that we are are geared to learning 
language easily and readily. 
 EKIN ERKAN 375 
psychological flux of sensations that affect the mind ‘from within,’ measured as intensive 
magnitudes, corresponding to the category of Quality in the Anticipations of  Perception, made 
explicit by arithmetic.  
For Kant, I consciously represent a line if I apprehend it segment-by-segment under 
the form of time, i.e., successively. In his discussion of extensive and intensive 
magnitudes, Kant argues that although we can represent qualities, e.g., redness, through 
an "instantaneous" apprehension all "at once," we have to apply a "successive 
apprehension" for the representation of extended spaces and times. While we may 
spatially intuit a triangle "at once", through this intuition we do not yet perceive the 
triangle as a spatially extended figure—extended magnitudes are represented by 
successively adding a basic measure over time (A164/B204; A167/B209). In addition to 
spatial intuition, the perception of outer objects for Kant constitutively involves the 
differentiation of spatial segments and motions, and involves both apprehension and self-
affection. This division entails the dimensions of space and time, the “forms of inner and 
outer sense”, respectively. All intuited ‘individuals’ appear to the subject already as 
spatially extended, localized in space, and numerically individuated in accordance with 
the principles of geometry. The qualitative depth of space and the qualities that “fill” 
space consists of a psychological dimension of intensive magnitudes, quantized in terms 
of “degrees of reality,” corresponding to arithmetic as formalizing the chronological 
structure of time as succession:  
In all appearances, the real that is the object of sensation has intensive magnitude, 
that is, a degree…[e]very color, as for instance red, has a degree which, however 
small it may be, is never the smallest; and so with heat, the moment of gravity, etc. 
(A166-A169/B202-B207) 
Kant here takes sensations to be caused by something real in bodies—colors are 
sensations, caused by bodies, and explicable by rationalist science. This is precisely why, 
despite being sensations, they are not imaginary/false. While colors are subjective and 
relative to individuals, they are not to be reduced to color-sensations or imaginary 
sensations because. Judgment is what allows for the application of this rationalist science. 
As such, the intensive ordering of psychological being and extensive ordering of physical 
being are implicitly at work in intuition before the subordination of sensibility to concepts 
in judgment, and before mathematical knowledge is acquired. This conformity between 
the understanding and the objects given by intuition requires further analysis. Where 
does this primitive “ordering” come from, if it is neither the activity of the understanding 
in judging, nor a purely passive reception of unformed data in the sensory manifold? 
Which “faculty” is responsible for being the lawgiver here? There must be, Kant argues, 
a “mediating representation” that is at once sensory and intellectual, defined by its 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 376 
“homogeneous” distribution across the two faculties. This is the role that Kant assigns to 
the transcendental imagination, (facultas imaginandi; Einbildungskraft), involving the 
operations of the “schematism.” 
… there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category 
[concept] on the one hand and the appearance [intuited object] on the other, and 
makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating 
representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet intellectual on 
the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the transcendental 
schema. (A138/B177) 
These mediating representations entail that intuition is already active, “guiding” the 
subject by coordinating it to its environment. The imagination presupposes and acts 
upon the manifold of pure intuition, as what is given without form by sensibility in its 
purely passive dimension. 
The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the 
manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold by means the imagination 
is the second thing, but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure 
synthesis unity, and that consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic 
unity, are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us, and 
they depend on the understanding. (A79/B105) 
 The labor of the imagination supposes an originary synthesis, more primitive than 
that between sensibility and the understanding in judgment, but more developed than 
the barren reception of sense-data. Insofar as it conforms to the categories of the 
understanding, the imagination involves something an originary, proto-conceptual unifying 
function, which suggests that the understanding must itself contribute to its activity. Yet 
while it organizes the data of sensibility prior to judgment, it already orients the subject 
prior to overt conceptualization. 
In the A-Deduction, the spontaneity of the transcendental imagination is defined as 
a threefold power of synthesis, following the pure receptivity of what Kant names the 
synopsis of the sensory manifold: “If therefore I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because it 
contains a manifold in its intuition, a synthesis must always correspond to this, receptivity 
can make cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity” (A97). This threefold 
power of synthesis corresponds to the three subjective ‘sources’ of all empirical 
knowledge: perception, imagination, and apperception. First, the pure synthesis of  apprehension in 
intuition guides the individuation of the sensory manifold into a consistent “image” (Bilde) 
or unified representation (A97), thereby giving form to the formless [Enbildung] (A120). 
In its pure or transcendental deployment, it is rooted in time qua form of inner sense 
(A115). Second, the syntheses of  reproduction by the imagination conditions the association 
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of distinct representations across divergent moments, conditioning the unity and relations 
bestowed by the mind to appearances as objects in time. It is on the basis of this power 
of association that the reproductive imagination makes possible the empirical 
recollection of an object that is no longer before the senses, the capacity to keep track of 
an object as it changes across time or as it disappears from view, as well as the capacity 
to anticipate an object in sight of another. The associations between intuited 
representations drawn by the imagination in its empirical use must already belong to the 
constitution of appearances themselves. For if sensory intuition provided no consistency 
or regularity, the mind could never learn to anticipate or bind representations 
corresponding to different objects, or even be able to track the development of a singular 
object and its parts that subsist across time across changes.   
[I]f cinnabar was sometimes red, sometimes red and sometimes black, sometimes 
heavy and sometimes light... I would never have the opportunity to associate - i.e. 
my imagination would never have the occasion to associate - the heavy cinnabar 
with the colour red.  
But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first 
parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order 
represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a 
complete representation would never be obtained: none of the above-mentioned 
thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and 
time, could arise (A101-102/B129) 
But while apprehension conditions the formation of a discrete representation, the 
imagination seems to condition the possible objectivation of appearances as subsisting in 
time. Without the unifying power of the imagination to bind representations across 
temporal changes, we would not only lose our capacity to recollect formerly experienced 
objects or project new ones on the basis of previous intuitions; more radically, intuitions 
would yield no unity as representations (A101). The syntheses of apprehension must thus 
be considered indissociable from those of the imagination, and must presuppose the 
latter. For insofar as the imagination provides the conditions for the representation of 
objects in time, it conditions even the possibility of any empirical perception of ‘images.’ 
This is the transcendental role of the productive imagination which underwrites its empirical, 
reproductive use. It is the primary spontaneity of thinking which guides the articulation 
of intuition and which therefore conditions the associations drawn by the reproductive 
imagination. Kant therefore describes the productive imagination as “the origin of all 
synthesis,” since it is the pure transcendental synthesis of this power which grounds the 
possibility of all experience. In this way, the imagination conceals “the ultimate source 
of the mystery of synthetic a priori judgments” (A110), and so is “a faculty of synthesis a 
priori” (A123).   
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Insofar as it is the a priori condition to speak of a representation of anything 
whatsoever, the transcendental imagination must be the ultimate source for the third 
synthesis of  recognition, not only in the empirical identification of discrete objects by a 
subject, but as the articulation of objective representings as part of a single consciousness. 
Pure apperception guarantees that the orderly connection between empirical 
representations correspond to the temporal experience of a unified self, understood as a 
universal medium of representation. This is the function of the transcendental unity of  
apperception: it annexes a combination of objective representings to a single temporal 
consciousness, securing the correlation between the “I think” and the object (“X”) (A117-
8).  
For in me they can represent something only in so far as they belong with all others 
to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected 
[…] This synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the former is 
to be a priori necessary, the synthesis must also be a priori. The transcendental 
unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an a priori 
condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge 
[…] Thus the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of 
imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, 
especially of experience. (A116) 
The associative powers of the reproductive imagination supposes that appearances 
themselves exhibit an orderly connection. Similarly, their combination into causal 
relations across temporal instances supposes an “affinity” between representations 
proper to “original apperception,” wherein appearances relate to each other as a unified 
nature that corresponds to the possible experience of a singular consciousness. 
Accordingly, the organization of appearances in intuition exhibit an orderly connection 
in accordance with the categories of the understanding, which the latter make explicit i.e. 
the alethic modal relations that organize causal descriptions and explanations in the 
conceptual order correspond to real modal relations between appearances in space and time 
(A112). This means that transcendental apperception guarantees not only the 
compossibility of appearances within a singular experiential field, but the isomorphy 
between concepts and sensory intuitions, between inferential relations in the logical 
order and lawful correlations between appearances in the material order. Such empirical 
correspondences suppose thus the transcendental correlation between the “I think” and 
the object (“X”) that grounds the unity of apperception, i.e. that objects and their 
relations can be represented diachronically in experience. It is the binding power of the 
transcendental imagination, suspended between sensibility and the understanding, that 
forms objective representations from appearances as formed “images.”  
The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary 
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connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental" function 
of imagination, because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding appearances, 
would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience. 
(A124) 
What is it, in virtue of which we represent an outer object as something which is 
temporally determinate and stable? It necessarily involves our inner representing of an 
object’s representation, with the relevant representational state taken as corresponding 
to temporal relations and other representations/states in us. To represent some object as 
a particular kind of object means representing one’s present intuition of this object as 
standing in determinate temporal relations to other representations. Hence, to represent 
something as some S at time t means to represent one’s present intuition of this S as 
continuous to St-1 and St+1. To represent any object as of a particular kind means 
representing one’s current, actual intuition as being of the same object as a non-actual 
but possible simultaneous intuition of it from a different spatial perspective.  
The concept of an empirical object tracks the intuitively given features of the world. 
For example, the concept of ‘redness’ tracks intuitively given redness. There is to some extent 
a non-problematic homogeneity at play here. The intuitively given features of the world 
are the features that my empirical concepts latch on to. To the extent that my empirical 
concept ‘red’ has generality and a certain logical signature, it fits into judgment, which 
intuitions by themselves do not have. That which the concept takes up is an intuition. 
There is a certain ‘fit’ between intuitions and concepts. This ‘fit’ obtains because 
intuitions are products of syntheses—a bunch of sensory features are synthesized into an 
intuition. As such, this synthesis involves apprehension in intuition, which includes the 
dual act of Durchlaufen and Zusammennehmung: running through and holding together 
(A99). This synthesis is a temporal action, evinced with the threefold synthesis: if I do 
not not run through the manifold of a given intuition in time, it would be an absolute 
unity for me. Furthermore, I would never be able to form a conceptual thought from it. 
Thus, it is only because it is given to me with my form of intuition that can I create 
intuitions. This fact makes intuitions somewhat homogenous with any type of conceptual 
cognition, because both cognitions and intuitions are products of synthesis—the 
synthetic activity of the mind is presupposed in both. Kant can thus suppose that, at the 
most basic level, concepts and intuitions share a certain amount of structural similarity.  
It is critical here to underscore that schemata are rules. Thus, I cannot express how 
to do anything in a concept—a concept, for Kant, is a hierarchical genus-species 
structure, and to instruct one how to apply a concept to an object requires a 
rule/schemata. The concept figures in a judgment, which has the structure of an 'S is P' 
or ‘Fx’ proposition. As such, concepts are cognitively meaningful in judgment-structures. 
To see how judgment has reference to a sensibly given object requires an actual object 
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in the world. Hence, the "third thing" Kant speaks of is the transcendental rule or 
judgment itself (B177). The transcendental schema is well suited to be this "third thing" 
because it is intellectual, like the categories, and sensible, like intuition. This schema 
solves a problem unsolved and implicit by the end of §26 of the B-Deduction—this 
question concerns the intuitions of space and time, which are pure images tailored to the 
requirements of experience, as laid down by the categories. How are these pure images 
produced? The Transcendental Deduction did not address this query but solely told us 
that these pure images involve a synthesis carried out by the imagination and that this 
synthesis must conform to the synthetic unity of pure apperception, the objectively valid 
(objektiv gültig, i.e., holds for all of us) formal principle of the understanding which secures 
the relation between our sensible representations and an object and holds for all of us. 
Kant notes that the “concept of the understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the 
manifold in general" (B178/A139), a result of the Deduction. The concept of the 
understanding, meaning any one of the categories, is a form of synthesis of the manifold 
in general. Time, the form of intuition in inner sense (since all of our representations are 
stretched out in time)—and thus the formal condition of the manifold in inner sense—
contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. The kind of synthetization that my 
categorial concepts govern is itself a form of structuring representations in time. This 
condition is central for Heidegger and for Sellars. 
 
III 
If I am to cognize an object as "this one thing", "this portion of it," or as a variety of 
things/totality of things, the temporal nature of my representations is already implicated 
(B178/A139). Any thought contains a determination of the target-cognition vis-a-vis 
other cognitions that either must have or can have occurred prior to it and that must or 
will occur after it. I would not be able to have an isolated thought if it were not in the 
context of other thoughts, as I would not have an isolated representation unless it was in 
the context of other representations. Hence, time-determination is the bedrock of 
Schematism, which necessarily involves recognizing representations as time-determined: 
"the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination, the 
schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in space) is a product and as it were a 
monogram of pure a priori imagination, through which and in accordance with 
which the images first become possible, but which must be connected with the 
concept, to which they are in themselves never fully congruent, always only by 
means of the schema that they designate" (B181/A142). 
A monogram is a set of letters (e.g., initials) that have to be 
overlaid/interlaced/interwoven upon something else. That is, they have to be graphically 
connected. This spatial image of overlaid letters that are graphically/spatially connected 
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underscores the binding role of schema. The metaphor of the monogram underscores 
that spatial connection is what actually signifies a temporal connection, as time is the 
form of our intuitions. For my intuitions are temporally structured—I do not perceive 
time, rather perceptions are given in time. Similarly, categorial cognitions are “stretched 
out” in time as they have a contextual-temporal structure. Again, the temporal 
dimension to inner sense is crucial here. According to the doctrine of “schematism” qua 
concepts (A137–47/B176–87), every concept has an implicit, sensibility-involving schema 
which provides a “pattern”/“monogram” (A142/B181). This pattern/monogram 
specifies the general sensible form of all instances of the concept in serving as a rule for 
the providing of a concept with an image. Vis-à-vis this schema, we represent action of 
concept-construction. This representation carries general information about the rule-
governing of the construction alongside specified singular information regarding the 
particular form which constructed images under the rule will have. 
With mathematical concepts, e.g., the concept of a triangle, the schematism provides 
rules for constructing spatial images. With pure concepts— which are not derived from 
the senses, and have their source in the understanding—the schema produces/is a 
transcendental time determination (A138–139=B177–178). For example, the schema for 
the pure concept of substance is ‘the persistence of the real in time’, ‘[t]he schema of 
actuality is existence at a determinate time’, and ‘[t]he schema of necessity is the existence 
of an object at all times’ (A144–145/B183–184). In addition to dealing with how pure 
images are produced, the Schematism section also asks: how does the imagination carry 
out this synthesis? The imagination takes its instructions from the categories by 
interpreting them. The imagination has latitude to a great degree in doing this, for its 
interpretation takes the form of an image, while its instructions do not: thus, we have 
heterogeneity. The heterogeneity as such is not the problem for Kant, however. Rather, 
the problem is what is required for graphic interpretation of the categories—the latitude 
heterogeneity bestows on the imagination allows the imagination to offer multiple 
interpretations of the same thing from different perspectives (Laywine 2020: 250-251). 
We require different perspectives in our search for understanding, precisely because we 
are finite beings and no single image can capture every aspect of the object our interest 
may be fixed upon. And this is precisely what inspires Heidegger, in Kant und das Problem 
der Metaphysik (hereafter: KPM), to associate Kant's account of imagination with the 
problem of human finitude.  
Heidegger tells us that Kant is to be credited for interrogating the demands of 
metaphysics to a degree found in no philosopher before or after him, as he was the first 
to see the “abyss”, or finitude, to which thinking leads in its search for a ground (KPM 
161). For Heidegger, the propaedeutic task of “laying the ground of metaphysics” and 
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assigning it to pure reason leads to the crisis of the critical project. For Heidegger, this 
occurs as Kant’s account of the faculties approaches the “mysterious” power called “the 
transcendental imagination,” in which the articulation between thinking and sensing 
becomes obscure. For Heidegger, Kant sets a limit with “the unknown,” not only in the 
transcendent limit of noumenal exteriority but also within experience, therein limiting 
the possibility of knowing. Kant thus makes a mistake as it is at this point that Kant turns 
away, Heidegger tells us, where he should not have; and in turning away, Kant assimilates 
the mysterious workings of the imagination back into the understanding: 
In the radicalism of his questions, Kant brought the “possibility” of metaphysics to 
this abyss. He saw the unknown. He had to shrink back. It was not just that the 
transcendental power of imagination frightened him, but rather that in between 
[the two editions] pure reason as reason drew him increasingly under its spell. (118) 
For Heidegger, the encounter with the unknown/finitude threatens not only the 
system of judgment that animated Kant’s representational account of experience but also 
ruins the very possibility of transcendental grounding, which reconstituted the scientific 
and foundationalist prospects of philosophy since the neo-Kantian project of the mid-
19th Century, up to the phenomenological project inaugurated by Husserl and extended 
in Sein und Zeit (SZ). This critique is related to Heidegger’s broader project with the 
existential analytic of Dasein in SZ, where Heidegger distinguishes between (a) what is 
thought within an “ontic” register, in terms of those individual entities which comprise 
the world of “things,” and (b) the being of what is thought as such. This is what Heidegger 
calls the ontological difference between being and beings: being is not a being, and any attempt 
to think of being qua being as a thing confuse the modalities under which being is 
disclosed to experience as beings, and the “being of beings,” as such.  
It is thus the very attempt to conceive of the in-itself in positive terms, in analogy 
with the subjective and objective structures of experience, as Kant does, however 
minimally, which already transgresses the limits of finitude. Heidegger’s accusation is 
that Kant transgresses what he sees as a limit-condition and, more broadly, centers the 
subject’s structure rather than the structure outside the structure. Hence, in §23 of SZ, 
Heidegger contests that the subjective “feeling” incarnated in the body is a sufficient 
condition for orientation in the “world” and, citing Kant’s 1786 Was heißt: sich im Denken 
orientieren, Heidegger maintains that “‘through the mere feeling of a difference of the two 
sides of my body’ I could never find myself in a world.” Heidegger here underscores that 
Kant’s transcendental investigation misses the “existential constitution of the In-der-
Welt-sein” (1927, 109). Heidegger responds to Kant by showing that the most original 
condition for orientation does not lie within the subject but, instead, in the structure of 
being-in-the-world. 
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Given that one of Heidegger’s central aims is undoing Cartesian mind-body dualism, 
this idea of human existence as being-in-the-world is in contrast to traditional inner-
outer dichotomies, including  Kant’s inner/outer sense, and objects of 
appearance/thing-in-itself. Albeit Dasein originally and linguistically entails spatial 
reference, Heidegger also notes that being-in-the-world involves an openness to “being” 
mediated by the human embodied, worldly, and temporal condition. One even finds this 
connection in Heidegger’s late Zollikoner Seminare, in which the idea of Leib or lived body 
is opposed to the inheritance of Cartesian dualism in contemporary psychology reflected 
in the mechanistic notion of the body/Körper (Nuzzo 2008: 349 n.39). Given Heidegger’s 
claim that “the body is the necessary, though not sufficient condition for relations (to the 
world)” (1987b, 204, 207, 220, 232–235), he places Kant’s transcendental view of 
embodiment and the finitude of our knowledge in terms of the ontic-ontological 
difference (Dallmayr 1993: 240–241).  
Thus, for Heidegger, while the ontic individuation of everything that appears is said 
to be reference-dependent on Dasein’s sense-endowing intentional acts and its 
‘comportments,’ the being of these entities is said to be radically sense and reference-
independent from all intentional acts. To elide the radical autonomy of being with 
respect to its modes of appearing would be to conflate the two sides of the ontological 
difference, and to postulate the possibility of reference independence between entities 
and their conditions of sense (“modes of disclosure”), falling into the trap of modeling 
the in-itself on the conditions of sense. However, the claim that being-in-itself cannot be 
even conceived as determined in analogy (or isomorphy) to the conditions of sense under 
which objective being is disclosed is premised on a kind of representational nihilism. 
Heidegger’s mistake is to assume that being cannot have counterpart determinations to 
those semantic contents bestowed by our descriptive concepts or explanatory 
frameworks, establishing the conditions of sense that fix our conditions of reference. And 
indeed, even if specific conditions of sense mediate not only our cognitive comportments 
when referring to objects and their properties through discursive means, but to the entire 
network of practical significances by virtue of which we interact with entities in 
“circumspect” activity, as Heidegger argues, it would still not follow that the existence of 
entities depends on the conditions of experience or the acts of experiencing subjects. 
Putting this to the side, in KPM, Heidegger notes that Kant introduces a proto-
analytic of Dasein by revealing conditions of our finitude, i.e., the role played by the 
productive imagination in mediating between human sensibility and the requirements of 
our finite understanding. Yet for Heidegger, Kant’s pure intuition is always and 
necessarily receptive and passive, and invests the transcendental imagination of all active 
function. Heidegger takes note that Kant’s revision in the B-Deduction clarifies the way 
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that the organization of appearances by the imagination correspond to concepts. He thus 
describes the understanding as the source of all synthesis, both in the sensory manifold 
(figurative synthesis, synthesis speciosa) and between concepts (intellectual synthesis, 
synthesis intellectualis) such that the productive imagination concerns the structuration of 
the former in accordance with the latter: the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is 
“an effect of the understanding on intuition,” one that acts “in accordance with the 
categories.” 
Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the 
subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the 
concepts of understanding, belongs to sensibility; but insofar as its synthesis is still 
an exercise of spontaneity […] the imagination is to this extent a faculty for 
determining sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with 
the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is an 
effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first (and at the same time the 
ground of all others) to objects of the intuition that is possible us. (B152) 
And yet, qualifying the scope of the transcendental deduction to the realm of possible 
experience, Kant reckons that, “before” the imagination acts as an emissary of the 
understanding on intuition, the latter must be given to the subject, without us being able 
to determine how this takes place (B145). According to Heidegger, Kant’s deduction of 
the categories determines the scope of their application to the forms of intuition, such 
that we cannot determine why we must experience the world in such a way (B146). In 
this way, Heidegger argues, Kant’s transcendental enquiry is not only delimited to the 
realm of possible experience, but experience is circumscribed to the requirements of a 
transcendental logic under the authority of the understanding. It is by subordinating the 
figurative synthesis of thought to the conceptualizing and objectivizing activity of the 
understanding that, Heidegger argues, Kant’s critical “laying the ground” for 
metaphysics ultimately devolves in a metaphysics of the subject. Heidegger refers to 
Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics, where the “forming power” (bildene Kraft) of the imagination 
is localized as part of a “Rational Psychology.” The tripartite, progressive constitution of 
the objective syntheses of apperception indexed to the imagination are thus correlated 
to the subjective constitution of inner sense, and thus to the three temporal dimensions of 
the present, past, and future. In this way, the imagination conditions any succession of 
instances within which entities in time subsist (180).  
1. The faculty of taking a likeness [Abbildung], the representations of which 
are of the present time: facultas formandi.  
2. The faculty of reproduction [Nachbildung], the representations of which are 
of a past time: facultas imaginandi.  
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3. The faculty of prefiguration [Vorbildung], the representations of which are 
of a future time: facultas praevidendi. (122)  
Heidegger’s framework reiterates the structure of a metaphysics of presence as part 
of what Heidegger names ‘now-time,’ wherein temporal modalities are considered as 
modifications of the present. The future is conceived as a ‘now-not-yet’ and the past as 
a ‘now-no-longer.’ If Heidegger is correct, in transposing the activity of the 
understanding to the imagination, Kant not only reifies the categorial framework of 
substance metaphysics into a metaphysics of the subject, but the latter turns out to 
infiltrate the forms of intuition. Furthermore, behind the sequential distribution of time 
in its three modalities from the purview of the present, the imagination is apparently the 
a priori condition for the form of presence as such, which unifies all representations. This 
is what Heidegger names “primordial time,” revealed by the imagination and the real 
condition for the syntheses of now-time and for the passing of presence.  
Pure intuition can form the pure succession of the now-sequence only if, in itself, it 
is imagination as that which forms, reproduces, and anticipates. Although, on the 
ordinary plane of experience where “we take account of time,” we must consider it to be 
a pure succession of nows, this succession by no means constitutes primordial time. On 
the contrary, the transcendental imagination as that which lets time as the now-sequence 
spring forth is—as the origin of the latter—primordial time.  (Heidegger KPR: 181) 
This is the pivotal point at which Heidegger detects a recoil in Kant’s critical method 
before the “abyss” of primordial time, which apparently incurs Kant to retreat into pure 
“reason”. For Heidegger, this means that Kant subordinates transcendental enquiry to 
the requirements of transcendental logic and, as such, that Kant was incapable of 
carrying through the aim of a “subjective deduction”. Because this mystery of 
“primordial time” was beyond the reach of Kant’s purported transcendental 
Anthropology and Psychology, Kant assimilated the formative function of the 
imagination to the understanding in order to save pure reason (KPR: 117).7 
How is the baser faculty of sensibility also to be able to constitute the essence of 
reason? Does not everything fall into confusion if the lowest takes the place of the 
highest? What is to happen with the venerable tradition, according to which Ratio and 
Logos have claimed the central function in the history of metaphysics? Can the primacy 
of Logic fall? Can the architectonic of the laying of the ground for metaphysics in 
general, the division into Transcendental Aesthetic and Logic, still be upheld if what it 
 
7 As Heidegger notes, the Transcendental Deduction had to be at once Objective 
["objektive"] and Subjective, that is, as pertaining to the operation of the faculty of thinking itself. 
See KPM, 116. 
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has for its theme is basically to be the transcendental power of imagination? Will not the 
Critique of  Pure Reason have deprived itself of its own theme if pure reason reverts to the 
transcendental power of imagination? Does not this ground-laying lead us to an abyss? 
In the radicalism of his questions, Kant brought the possibility of metaphysics to this 
abyss. He saw the unknown. He had to shrink back. It was not just that the 
transcendental power of imagination frightened him, but rather that in between [the two 
editions] pure reason as reason drew him increasingly under its spell. (118)   
Heidegger extols Kant’s contextualization of judgment, praising that it is not solely 
the combining of concepts that is relevant in making judgments but that something else 
is involved—the intuition, i.e. the synthesis of a manifold of sensations. For Heidegger, 
Kant’s analysis in terms of the fundamental principles of understanding brings to bear 
the “between” as a critical context for the inclusion of any thing in judgment (Engelland 
2017: 157). Furthermore, Kant anticipates Heidegger by situating rationalism, with its 
coeval “dogmatism” within its limits and context. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s critiques are 
quite pointed: despite Kant’s view of judgment makes a significant advancement, it also 
remains subject to the dominance of thought, specifically insofar as Kant’s conception of 
judgment—and Kant’s transcendental idealism tout court fails to grasp history, exacting 
an improper, and rationalistic-cum-dogmatist disjunction between “being and thought.”. 
For Heidegger, the proposition of judgment, “traced back to the between, ultimately 
rests on the fundamental disposition granted in history” is to exact a “determination” 
(Bestimmung), which requires initially being determined and disposed by history’s 
“fundamental disposition” (Grundstimmung) (ibid.; Heidegger 1989: 391/273).8 
The Heideggerian “corrective” to Kant consists in freeing temporality from 
chronological time, and with it the representational correlation between the subject and 
the object which grounds apperception. The existential analytic of Dasein thus pursues 
the analytic task by tracing the conditions of intentional disclosure to its pre-
representational state. This involves the practical bases of Dasein’s being-in-the-world 
pursuing the “progress of the existential ontology which begins with the analysis of 
everydayness and [which] takes aim solely at the working-out of the unity in the 
transcendental primal structure of the finitude of Dasein in human beings” (KPM 165). 
Heidegger’s corrective privileges the present for representational cognition, revealing the 
primacy of the future in the circumspect activity of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. 
Moreover, it attempts to carve out the possibility of a transcendental deductive schema 
 
8 In a 1961 lecture, Heidegger demonstrates that he still thinks Kant puts thought in essential 
relation to intuition, although Heidegger no longer suggests Kant subordinates thought to 
intuition (459/347). 
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of temporality from time, and no longer pursue a subjective deduction in which time 
would correspond to the categories of the pure understanding. But is Heidegger correct 
in his critique of Kant’s Schematism and conception of imagination?  
In §24 of the B-Deduction, Kant calls the aforementioned synthesis speciosa—in 
particular, the synthesis of a manifold of sensible intuition—“figurative” in order to 
distinguish it from the "intellectual" synthesis carried out by the understanding through 
the categories "with respect to the manifold of an intuition as such" (B151). For Kant, 
image-formation—even when carried out a priori—is not equivalent to understanding. 
This is because, contra understanding, no image has logical structure for Kant and, more 
importantly, imagination and understanding do not operate independently of one 
another. A manifold is an abstraction useful only for conceptually isolating the activity 
of the understanding in order to demonstrate its distinctive character. The manifold we 
actually receive is always of a specific kind—namely, the one given to us under the forms 
of human sensibility. The manifold undergoes synthesis by the understanding, but not 
without the help of the imagination. And, by the same token, the imagination never 
synthesizes a manifold of human intuition without the direction of the understanding. 
Kant characterizes the imagination by itself when he remarks on it as "blind function of 
the soul” of which we are seldom conscious (B103). We can here isolate the imagination 
as distinct from the understanding to “test” Heidegger’s critique. We see that even when 
isolated, imagination still serves at the behest of the understanding—Kant remarks that 
the unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding, 
and precisely the same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of imagination, 
is the “pure understanding” (A119).  
Here we have the “pure understanding” that Heidegger construes as an outgrowth 
of the imagination, which is itself the core faculty of cognition in human beings. The 
“pure understanding” is considered as that which mediates what seems initially to be an 
insuperable opposition between sensibility and understanding. On this view, to talk 
about the understanding as the source of legislation for nature disguises the indispensable 
work of the imagination (KPM, §17). However, Heidegger is mistaken here. For Kant 
neither says nor implies that the categories ultimately come from the imagination, nor that 
judgment as such is one of its activities. Rather, the categories and judging are distinctive 
contributions made by the (pure) understanding. The “pure understanding” (A119) is 
hence an artefact of the so-called “argument from above,”9 carrying out the deduction 
of the categories from pure apperception.  
 
9 The “Argument from Above” (A116-9) challenges the rationalist position that knowledge 
can be produced through the intellect alone. 
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If we were to proceed as Heidegger does, and call upon nothing but the respective 
characterizations of the synthesis of apprehension, the reproduction in the imagination, 
and the recognition of concepts, it is almost impossible to see how we can characterize 
the understanding except as Kant does at A119. But Kant enriches his conception in 
moving forward; indeed, as reflected by the Schematism’s taking up the Deduction’s 
problematic and driving it further, Kant’s account of experience would not work without 
an account of the graphic elements of  understanding. The imagination’s role is to elaborate 
such an account—the unique feature of the productive imagination is that it mediates 
between sensibility and the understanding, and this is precisely why Kant says that we 
can have no knowledge unless the sensibility and understanding cooperate. 
Heidegger’s “return to Kant” was motivated on the aforementioned methodological 
crisis in the pursuit of a transcendental deduction, a crisis already perceptible in The Basic 
Problems of  Phenomenology, i.e. the precarity phenomenological science had to face when 
showing how the temporal disclosure of beings as constitutive of Dasein’s finite 
transcendence (ekstasis) was deducible from the being of time as such (ekstema). As Heidegger 
strives to show how the “temporality of our being-there” (Zeitlichkeit des Dasein) is to be 
transcendentally derived from “time of being” (Temporalitat des Sein), the resources of a 
transcendental method falter. More precisely, it is the untenability of securing a 
transcendental deduction in the attempts to describe how “primordial time” functions as 
the real condition from which not only chronological but ‘existential’ time was derived, that 
the resources of phenomenological analysis become voided. For how are we to think of 
primordial time, shorn from all categorial determination and formal ordering, 
untarnished by the metaphysically-laden endowments of the understanding? How can 
transcendental logic proceed in the absence of any determination which would suffice to 
generate a deductive schema for the conditions of experience from being? For 
Heidegger, phenomenological disclosure can not correspond to any discrete “image” or 
objective schema, to no entity or tool, to no comportment or facultative power. The crisis 
of the sciences that, according to Heidegger, was to be salvaged by phenomenological 
foundations now leads to the crisis of the transcendental itself, as it ungrounds itself in the 
void of being, and as such ceases to provide an epistemic footing for metaphysical 
enquiry.  
Let us now turn to Sellars’ “naturalized Kantianism,” which attempts to avoid the 
metaphysical excess and skeptical consequences of transcendental philosophy, neither 
succumbing to the temptation of absolutizing the conditions of experience into the 
mechanisms of nature as a whole, nor relinquishing the project of positive epistemology. 
Sellars’ task consists in identifying the generic logical constraints that govern the process 
through which empirical science progressively realizes the representational task to 
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describe and explain the categorial structure of spatio-temporal being, as part of a self-
correcting enterprise through which knowing realizes itself diachronically.  
 
IV 
In Science and Metaphysics, Sellars describes the problematic coordination between the 
receptivity and spontaneity of the faculties. For just as sensible intuition turns out to have 
its own mode of productivity, so the understanding has its own mode of receptivity, as it 
synthesizes the endowments of sensibility (2). Sellars underscores Kant’s attempt to 
negotiate between the faculties, where intuition provides the point of contact between 
mind and world. If in dislodging the transcendental imagination as a separate faculty in 
the first edition Kant made the source of intuition’s spontaneous productivity mysterious, 
Sellars also notes the danger in the second edition where, assimilating the imagination 
to the understanding, Kant transfers this obscurity to the relation that space holds to 
sensibility. The “form of outer sense,” which individuates the sensible belongs squarely to 
the spontaneity of thought, leads to the unwelcome conclusion that “[s]pace would seem 
to disappear from receptivity as such” (8). Thus, the “intensive magnitudes” that 
compose the pre-individuated sensory manifold are separated from spatial being, with 
the equally unwelcome conclusion that the material contents of our intuitions are no 
longer understood as having a physical nature, but rather a purely psychological ontological 
status.  
Kant’s treatment of sensation is notoriously inadequate and inept. From the premise 
that sense impressions as mental states are neither literally extended nor in physical 
space he infers that they are in no sense spatial, i.e., that they in no way have a 
structure which conforms to a geometrical axiomatics. The idea that sensations are 
“purely intensive magnitudes” has always made it difficult to understand how sense 
impressions could have a meaningful connection with physical states of affairs. 
(KTE: 269).  
For Sellars, Kant’s account preemptively rules out the possibility that sensations 
could be in any sense spatially extended, obscuring the connection between intuition as 
an act and intuited individuals as the product of this act. Kant is charged with making 
space a byproduct of the productive imagination, a case of the understanding 
functioning “in a special way”; as such, the relation of space to the sensible realm that 
serves as the “brute fact or constraining element of perceptual experience” becomes 
plainly unintelligible (9). While Sellars credits Kant for distinguishing the dimension of 
receptivity in the “radically non-conceptual character of sense,” it is because in doing so 
Kant avoids assimilating the non-conceptual character of sensing to the conceptually 
mediated intuition of individuals, resisting absolute idealism:  
Indeed, it is only if Kant distinguishes the radically non-conceptual character of 
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sense from the conceptual character of the synthesis of apprehension in intuition 
(which is, of course, to be distinguished from the conceptual synthesis of recognition 
in a concept, in which the concept occupies a predicative position) and accordingly, 
the receptivity of sense from the guidedness of intuition that he can avoid the 
dialectic which leads from Hegel’s Phenomenology to nineteenth-century idealism. 
(SM: 16)  
Sellars’ implicit rejoinder to the Hegelian solution, and his ultimate fidelity to Kant, 
consists in accepting that the intuition of individuals involves both a conceptual and even 
more primitively a proto-conceptual dimension that is prior to the subordination of 
particulars under universals in judgment. This is not to deny that there is an element of 
givenness in intuition that is resolutely not conceptual: the difficulty becomes how to 
negotiate between these different non-conceptual and conceptual aspects which guide 
the determination of the forms of intuition and individuals within and through them.  
Tracing these different levels, in The Role of  the Imagination in Kant’s Theory of  Experience, 
Sellars goes on to make a series of distinctions, in which the transcendental imagination, 
suspended between sensibility and the understanding, becomes progressively localized 
as it “guides” the determination of the contents of sensibility in intuition. 
The rule-bound formation of images by the transcendental imagination—viz., 
schematism—defines the constructability and localizability of all objects, whether 
physical or mental, in relation to perceivers. Schematism specifies a set of 
“transformation rules” that condition every empirical instance of objective 
apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. These transformation rules determine the 
concept of the object in question and in general; they are algorithmic “recipes” on whose 
basis a system navigates and orient itself within its environment, representing objects 
across perspectival changes in a rule-governed manner. Such schemata are thereby 
already operative in the mind that navigates the world and correspond to a set of 
conceptual rules, even before one is in a position to make these conceptually explicit through 
discursive cognition. Accordingly, Kant distinguishes between sensory schemata, 
corresponding to the concepts for empirical objects (“dog,” “triangle”), and pure schemata, 
corresponding to the categories that condition all empirical objectivation (“quantity,” 
“quality”), and which finally concern the structuring of all representations in time qua 
form of inner sense (A142/B181). 
Sellars critique is as follows. Attesting to its unconscious nature, Kant describes the 
schematism as a “blind” but originary “function of the soul” that provides the world of 
representation its objective ground (A94/A97, B127). It is described as a “secret art of the 
soul” on whose basis the phenomenal world gives way to the sequential ordering of 
impressions in time, and their externalization in space (B184). While Kant’s conception 
of the synthetic powers of the imaginations elucidates the primitive structuration of 
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intuition before the activity of judgment, the resources available for the deduction of the 
pure concepts of the understanding, and space and time, becomes increasingly elusive. 
According to Sellars, Kant’s conception of intuition is confused between singular 
representations, which are conceptual, and the non-conceptual manifold of receptivity 
(1968: 3–7). Like Heidegger, Sellars falters here for this “confusion” arises solely if we fail 
to distinguish between the roles of sensation and intuition—however, Kant keeps these 
two apart (Allais 2015: 149). 
Nevertheless, in separating the workings of the schematism from the imagination, 
Sellars argues, one must first distinguish between perceptual takings and what is believed about 
what is perceptually taken (IKTE 420). The former dimension specifies the “individuals of 
experience” given in intuition, which correspond syntactically to those complex-demonstrative 
phrases that compose the “this-such” grammatical subjects of a complete ‘Mentalese’ 
sentences, e.g. “this-juicy-red-apple.” In this sense, intuited individuals are already 
categorially specific, even though they do not function by themselves as universals or general 
terms that subordinate particulars in judgment, lacking thus grammatical form.10 The 
second dimension comprises how the grammatical subject or complex-demonstrative 
phrase which designate intuited individuals becomes compounded with a predicate that 
does function as a universal, e.g. “is edible.” In short, a perceptual episode of seeing a red 
juicy apple involves the synthesis between the perceptual taking of an intuited individual 
“This red juicy apple” (grammatical subject), and the believing that “[it] is edible” 
(grammatical predicate). These dimensions jointly enable the recognition of the object in 
empirical judgments, e.g. “This red juicy apple is edible.”  
Sellars underscores the difference between the resolutely non-conceptual sensing of  
something as the occurrent quality of an object directly presented to consciousness (e.g. 
seeing of a red apple its “facing surface” in a visual episode), and perceiving something as 
something, which involves an interpretative act of awareness (e.g. seeing a red juicy apple as 
juicy). Between these lies the gulf wherein the activity of the imagination reveals itself. 
While, in an episode of perceptual awareness, the “juiciness” of the apple may not directly 
be presented to the senses of the observer, it forms an “actuality” that is “not merely 
believed in”—one sees the apple itself  as pervasively juicy across varying sensory presentations 
before overt acts of judgment.  
To explain this dimension, Sellars distinguishes between the two central roles 
identified by Kant that the imagination plays insofar as it “guides intuition.” First, there 
 
10 “The hyphenated phrase ‘this-cube’ expresses a representing of something as a cube in a 
way which is conceptually prior to cube as a general or universal representation; that is, in a way 
which is conceptually prior to predication or judgment.” (SM 7) 
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is the formative labor of the productive imagination, producing “image-models” that 
objectivize the inputs given by the sensory manifold in relation to the perceiver. These 
have the general structure of “perceiver-confronting-object,” guiding the construction of 
a unified individual in intuition throughout varying sensory presentations. The 
productive imagination enables the subject to track discrete phenomena in the 
environment across varying perspectival changes, extracting complex patterns of sensory 
states that are constructed by the productive imagination (SM 424). The empirical 
construction of these image-models specifies the schemas for localizing objects and can 
be thus understood in analogy with practical rule-following, allowing a representational 
system to navigate its environment by representing and tracking objects in relation to 
specific problems-tasks. Schemas are understood in accordance with conceptual “recipes” 
that express an algorithmic structure, but no syntactic or grammatical structure. As such they lack 
categorial and logical form.   
In short, we do not perceive of the object what might be called “categorial” 
features. For the image construct does not have categorial features. It has an 
empirical structure which we can specify by using words which stand for 
perceptible qualities and relations. But it does not have logical structure; notness, 
or-ness, allness, some-ness are not features of the image-model. They are features 
of judgment.” (SM: 463) 
[T]he productive imagination is a unique blend of a capacity to form images in 
accordance with a recipe, and a capacity to conceive of objects in a way which supplies 
the relevant recipes. Kant distinguishes between the concept of a dog and the 
schema of a dog. The former together with the concept of a perceiver capable of 
changing his relation to his environment implies a family of recipes for constructing 
image models of perceiver-confronting-dog. (KPI: 424) 
For Kant, the schematism produces a dynamic, continuously updated model for the 
construction and localization of objects in space and time, in coordination to perceivers. 
Thus, for Sellars, the objective correlates of those complex-demonstratives that specify 
what is perceptually taken in empirical cognition correspond dynamically to a 
representational system’s navigational routines. But if this is the case, and if we are not to 
preemptively conflate the imagination with that of the understanding’s functioning “in a 
special way,” then we must ask: which vocabulary, language, or theory provides the rule-
book, “in accordance with which” the subject produces image-models of objects, 
specifying the field of presentation and constructing the individual “this-suches” of 
perceptual takings? And how can we make use of such theory to characterize the 
organization of intuition without hypostasizing an empirical or formal register, avoiding 
gerrymandering problems concerning just which rule is at work? What Kant describes as 
a secret “art of the soul” in the imagination “visible” to us through discursive means. 
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Despite this mysterious nature, it is the imagination that preserves the rational 
ordering of appearances. In folding the imagination into the understanding in the second 
edition, the workings of the “soul” provides a presentation (Darstellung) of a mental whole 
in relation to which we can determine inner appearances, without cognizing the whole 
as such (Kraus 2020). Employed as an "analogue of a schema" (A665/B694), the idea of 
the soul substitutes for all those schemata that cannot be applied to inner appearances, 
outlining the domain in which inner experience can be operative as the empirical 
cognition of inner appearances. As Sellars puts it, this leads Kant to postulate absolutely 
basic and determinate ‘this-suches,’ which precisely correspond to the image-models of 
objects. For Sellars, this essentialized correlation between our qualitatively specific 
categorial determinations and non-categorially formed image-models reveals how, at the 
origin of synthesis that is the labor of the transcendental imagination, Kant not 
subordinates the latter to the understanding. This correlation models the transcendental 
application of the faculties on their empirical explicandum, reifying discursive 
determinations as foundational or “absolutely basic.” Hence, the schema for “perceiver-
confronting-apple” is modeled on “S perceives that there is a red apple over there.”  
The schematization of image-models of external objects that structure the intuition 
of those “individuals of experience” is modeled in analogy with empirical judgment—
those “absolutely determinate basic this-suches” that shape the categorially determined 
grammatical subjects of our perceptual takings. As Sellars shows, this places Kant in 
proximity to Aristotelian abstractionism, hiding an empiricist excess and a residual 
essentialism affecting Kant’s account of perceptual consciousness: 
Kant’s thesis, like the Aristotelian, clearly requires the existence of perceptual this-
suches which are limited in their content to what is ‘perceptible’ in a very tough sense of 
this term (the “proper sensibles”). It requires the existence of completely determinate 
‘basic’ perceptual this-suches. (SM 7)11 
 
11 Sellars’ appraisal is not necessarily fair, as Sellars elides Kant’s distinction of the different 
uses of the understanding, focusing instead on empirical use. According to Kant, the 
understanding "gives" (gibt) or "creates" (schafft) concepts, which are then employed as real 
predicates (A643/B671). Kant distinguishes two “real” uses of the understanding: a 
transcendental and empirical use (A296/B352). Given that Sellars’ project sidelines the 
transcendental in Kant, it is fair to say that he focuses on empirical use of the understanding, 
which must be exercised in light of sensible intuition (B128). And indeed, as Sellars realized, this 
involves the application of concepts to something real and, if legitimate, must be based on 
corresponding sensible intuitions. A category is applied to a sensible object by synthesizing the 
sensible world through which this object is "given" to the mind in accordance with the category. 
The resulting "intuition of an object is regarded as determined with regard to one of the logical 
functions of judgment" (B128). In turn, the categories gain sensible content in terms of the generic 
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As a result, even if the individuals furnishing the bedrock of our perceptual takings 
do not play an epistemic role outside of their occurrence in inference and judgment—
insofar as they are grafted by the productive imagination by a set of implicit rules 
corresponding with the categories—they are given to us already in conceptual-categorial 
shape in perceptual experience. This leads Kant to an iteration of the myth of the 
categorial Given, which encompasses at once an ontological and an epistemological 
aspect: (1) the idea that intuited representings are categorially structured, and (2) that a direct 
causal rather than properly “epistemic” link holds between being directly conscious of 
something and being aware of something as something: 
(Myth of the Categorial Given) If S is directly aware of an item x with 
categorial status C then S is directly aware that x has categorial status C. (Sellars 
1981b, §45). 
To reject the Myth of the given is to reject the idea that the categorial structure 
of the world—if it has a categorial structure—imposes itself on the mind as a seal 
imposes an image on melted wax. (EPM: §45)  
For Sellars, this is the point in which we not only a residual metaphysical essentialism in 
the characterization of the forms of intuition, and also a residual epistemic foundationalism 
 
spatio-temporal properties of objects they define. Employing the categories as rules of synthesis 
then results in real determination (reale Bestimmungen) of objects of experience; the “real” use 
determines real properties that are judged to be instantiated in objects as determined. Similarly, 
the application of an empirical concept as a real predicate to an object given in intuition consists 
in synthesizing the corresponding sensible manifold in accordance with the empirical concept 
and, if successful, results in recognizing that the object instantiates this concept; by reflecting the 
object of my current perception under the concept <ball>, I examine whether the object 
instantiates the marks that are contained in the concept, such as marks that are expressed by the 
partial concepts <spherical> and <able to bounce>. But Sellars’ diagnoses fails to appreciate 
Kant’s careful distinction between objects of mere thought and objects of possible experience, 
collapsing the former into the latter objects of empirical cognition. But, we ought to note that 
Kant also thought that through logical predication we determine an object of thought, which 
Kant calls a "logical something" (L-MP/L2 28:644) and an ens rationis (A292/B348). Through 
real predication based on corresponding empirical intuitions, we determine an object of 
empirical cognition as something empirically real (Bxxvin). The determination of an object of 
thought requires only logical possibility, in terms of a judgment that is conceivable without 
contradiction, but it does not require that the possibility of its “real” instantiation be proven. 
Thus, a judgment about a unicorn could be a perfectly fine determination of a "logical 
something” (or ens rationis), even if it has no real instantiation; compare this to a judgment about 
a square circle, which would not even be about a "logical something", but instead be a "logical 
nothing" (nihil negativum) (see: A290-292/B346/349). 
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that enables the postulation of bare individuals, in continuity with the substance 
metaphysical conception of being and the categorial conception of thought inherited 
from Aristotle, as a “system of judgement.”  
 
V 
Having analyzed the role of the imagination according to Sellars and Heidegger, let us 
now take stock. We are now in a better position to assess Kant’s relapse into a 
metaphysically loaded conception of the transcendental, continuous with residual 
epistemological foundationalism of the sort that Sellars criticizes under the title “the myth 
of  the given”. This relapse is operative at different levels within the representational theory 
of experience, including the characterization of the noumenal exterior, the 
characterization of the forms of intuition and the schematism of the imagination, the 
categorial account of judgment, and the unity of apperception. For Heidegger, the 
subordination of transcendental philosophy to the requirements of a logic infiltrates the 
way that the tripartite “formative powers” (bildende Kraft) of the productive imagination 
subordinate the form of time to the requirements of a logic, within the scope of a 
“Rational Psychology”. For Heidegger, the apprehension (Abbildung), reproduction 
(Nachbildung), and anticipation (Vorbildung) which orient the schematism comprises 
subordination of temporality to presence, as part of what Heidegger names “now-time.” 
As Kant assimilates the imagination to the understanding, so the pure power of the 
imagination as the temporal structuring of appearances as “primordial time” becomes 
mystified as via metaphysical reflection. 
Sellars emphasizes that, in conceiving time as the form of “inner sense,” the sensory 
manifold becomes interpreted as a field of purely “intensive magnitudes,” whose 
psychological nature become are problematically connected to physical space. The 
corrective proposed by Sellars can be understood as follows: to claim that there is a non-
conceptual dimension in sensory receptivity is not to claim that sensory episodes must 
be conceptually unintelligible, or incommensurate to a vocabulary specifying the 
physical structure of space: 
That the idea that visual perception always involves minimal conceptual 
representations is false does not, I believe, need to be argued. On the other hand, 
the idea that visual perception always involves sense impressions properly described 
by a special use of a minimal physical vocabulary does seem to me eminently 
capable of defense, once the confusion of sense impressions with the minimal 
conceptual representations which do occur in extremely guarded perception has 
been overcome. (SM: 15) 
In explaining the coordination between the forms of intuition as part of a naturalized 
transcendental framework, Sellars refuses to model development on the synthetic powers 
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of the transcendental subject, while also denying the Platonist solution of abstracting 
ontology and phenomenology from sensibility and space qua structures of experience. 
Implicit in both accounts is Kant’s inadequate treatment of space. For in separating the 
receptivity of sensibility from the structuring of space by the imagination under the 
understanding, Kant apparently reifies a particular conception of physical being in 
particular and of natural science in general, which universalizes the theoretically 
contingent and empirical postulates of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics 
as transcendental constants. In other words, Kant does not seem sufficiently sensitive to 
the difference between synthetic a priori truths insofar as they purport to track the invariant 
conditions of  our spatio-temporal experience, and what Hans Reichenbach famously referred to 
as “framework principles,” which furnish the base assumptions of any given scientific theory, 
and which determine how empirical data is to be understood in each case as theory-
laden. As a result, Kant fails to distinguish between the structures of  experience, which 
include the cognitive conditions for theorization, and a theory of  experience that attempts to 
make explicit these transcendental structures. Kant thus blurs the lines between the 
empirical and transcendental in thinking of natural science as closed historically. 
The conflation of empirical theories with transcendental constitution, in fact, 
infiltrates for Heidegger the core of Kant’s account of synthesis: despite the attempt to 
“ground” metaphysics, the different modes of transcendental synthesis that Kant 
postulated are extrapolated from empirical instances, once more under the requirements 
of a logic, in a psychologistic framework. What Heidegger shows is that this issue 
concerns the perils of securing a transcendental deduction which would suffice to ground 
empirical knowledge in the temporal unity of the subject. For Kant does not only inflect 
an essentialist metaphysics into the activity of the understanding with the categories 
within a ‘system of judgment’. As we have seen, Kant’s correlation between intuition and 
thinking can only be secured insofar as the forms of intuition themselves become imbued 
with a productivity that proceeds “in accordance with” the categories, as expressed in 
the proto-conceptual “image-forming” powers of the transcendental imagination, 
operating as a surrogate for the understanding. The intellectual spontaneity of the 
subject guides the schematization of time and space, as the articulation of the sensory 
manifold into representations. 
However, correcting the inadequate treatment of time and space in relation to the 
activity of the subject does not necessitate simply interrupting the metaphysical 
reification of presence in our conceptions of time, as Heidegger insists. And it doesn’t 
consist in merely replacing a Euclidean notion of space and Newtonian mechanics by, 
for example, a non-Euclidean geometry and Quantum Mechanical understanding of 
spacetime, which would only once more proceed by reifying an empirical and theoretical 
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framework.  Sellars takes us further than Heidegger here, as a post-Kantian realist-cum-
representationalist metaphysics involves making explicit the epistemic logic of revision 
through which conceptual and theoretical cognition progressive make explicit the 
structure of the forms of intuition. This means conceiving of thinking itself as a self-
correcting enterprise, in which the historical development of empirical science 
progressively realizes reason’s representational aspirations. Such a historicized naturalist 
alternative refuses the purely psychological status accorded to sensations, as well as 
temporalizing the conceptual activity of the understanding as it progressively makes 
explicit the structures of space and time in relation to scientific thought. The blurring of 
the lines between the empirical and transcendental becomes more acutely visible in how 
intuition is said to be  “guided” by the transcendental powers of the imagination, 
conceived as “effect” of the understanding on intuition.  
It would be preemptive, however, to conclude that any representational account of 
experience must be destined to such metaphysical reification, or else have to relinquish 
aspirations for a transcendental logic. For Sellars, the development of empirical science 
disrupts the “myth of substance” as it revises its central postulates. While the 
transcendental specifies the invariant structures of experience, the intelligibility of these 
structures is accomplished through the realization of empirical enquiry. In conjunction 
with Kant’s ahistorical conception of science in his account of the forms of intuition, by 
inflecting the categorial conception of being as substance into the functions of the 
understanding Kant’s representational account of the schematism elides how reason 
makes itself explicit as a protocol for cognizing the world to which it belongs.  
At the most general, the myth of the categorial given infiltrates the transcendental 
unity of apperception itself, describing the structural unity of the “I think” 
(transcendental subject) and the “X” of cognition (transcendental object) that 
subordinates thinking under the matrix of “conceptual identity.” More generally, the 
transcendental stance generates a version of the myth of the categorical given apposite 
to the different variants of correlating the thought and representation. Kant here is guilty 
of taking epistemically foundational the dyad between the subject and the object in 
apperception.  
Taken as a whole, the steps comprising the Kantian metaphysical relapse can be 
understood as diagnosing both a residual ontological dogmatism and epistemological 
foundationalism within the critical program: the myth of  substance and the myth of  the given, 
which specify the invariant forms of nature and subjectivity. 12 The extension of Sellars’ 
 
12 In developing with Sellars’ prospects for a process-ontological idiom apposite to naturalism, 
Johanna Seibt explicitly targets the “Myth of Substance” as a direct metaphysical counterpart of 
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critique of the myth of the given to all forms of metaphysical dogmatism and 
epistemological foundationalism  reiterates that the nature of experience is no more 
transparent to us than the entities we describe in the objective mode. And while Kant 
was certainly right in that the very possibility of empirical cognition is mediated by a 
distinctive set of aesthetic and intellectual faculties, what the critique of the myth of the 
given clarifies is that the concepts through which we make the structure of experience 
explicit is no less theoretically mediated and no more epistemically transparent than any 
other metaphysical or scientific theoretical framework concerning the natural world. 
Heidegger provides a coeval insight which clarifies that while transcendental discourse 
aims to think the experiential conditions for empirical discourse, it nevertheless remains 
epistemically dependent on the empirical concepts that we use to describe the world in 
already in ordinary objective discourse. In short, the rejection of the myth of the given 
must entail that all theories, regardless of whether they play a transcendental or empirical 
role, are constructed as part of a self-correcting cognitive enterprise 
In sum, the appropriation and correction of Kant proposed by Heidegger and Sellars 
allow us to distil three demands: (1) to avoid falling into an ahistoricist picture of  the thinking 
that reifies contingent theoretical or empirical structures as necessary-transcendental 
ones; (2) to avoid falling into a transcendental skepticism according to which knowledge of 
the world as it is ‘in itself ’ becomes impossible or unintelligible, risking a kind of 
psychologism that sets philosophy in “the slippery route to absolute idealism”; (3) to avoid 
falling into a kind of Platonist subjectalism that disavows representation at the price of 
transposing experiential structures onto nature writ large (c.f. Sacilotto 2020). 
In response to these three demands, what Sellars’ reconstruction of Kant points 
toward, I will suggest below, can be summarized in three central theses: (a) we can 
liberate our theory of experience from the foundationalist and ahistorical assumptions 
that blur the lines between the empirical and transcendental, without compromising the 
attempt to investigate how the invariant structures of experience condition our 
knowledge of the world; (b) we can reconcile the notion of noumenal reality as a “limit 
concept” not in metaphysical but alongside pragmatist lines, following Peirce, by 
understanding the “in-itself ” as a regulatory ideal which normatively orients science as a 
 
the myth of the given, to which indeed analytic philosophers would have remained beholden, 
using the Kantian conception of objectivity in terms of the complex demonstrative model as a 
paradigmatic expression: “Despite recent formal sophistication - in fact, even strongly supported 
by the standard interpretation of predicate logic - ontological thinking still is dominated by the 
categorial dualism of ‘thisness’ and ‘suchness,’ of objects and properties. Surprisingly few 
contemporary philosophers explicitly address let alone diagnose this curious conservativism.” 
(TCI 272). 
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“self-correcting enterprise,” through which mind represents the world of which it is part; 
(c) we can expand our concept of nature so as to both resist a crass reductionism that 
would eliminate the representational structures of experience, or else pursue a 
subjectalist transposition of experience into the world writ large. In pursuing these three 
theses, Sellars’ “naturalization of Kant” implies an anti-foundationalism in epistemology that 
describes reason as a protocol for revision and integration, and an anti-dogmatic 
metaphysical stance that expands our understanding of Nature to include the types of 
sensory and conceptual capacities that are associated with sapient experience. Therein, 
Sellarsian naturalism is coeval with an epistemic and ontological realism. The Sellarsian 
approach, however, is robustly anti-transcendental, denuding transcendental analysis’s 
forms of experience from dogmatic metaphysics as much as from its skeptical 
conclusions.  
At this final juncture, naturalization tout court may appear to be the victor, but, in 
fact, it is critical scientific realism as method which prevails. For both Heidegger and 
Sellars recognize the theoretical disunity of the sciences—the question of whether and 
how this disunity can/should be superseded is a salient if underdeveloped concern 
underlying both projects. Sellars notes that “there are as many scientific images of man 
as there are sciences which have something to say about man,” where each science 
deploys distinct instruments and methods; this “diversity [...] is compatible with intrinsic 
‘identity’ of the theoretical entities themselves” (2007, 388-89). Sellars, himself, runs up 
against a problem here, given his ineliminably modal character of scientific 
understanding, for the possibility of such unification in a straightforward way seems 
difficult to reach, since the entities as disclosed by different sciences are not identical in 
their modal character (e.g., quantum mechanics vs Newtonian physics). Heidegger offers 
a general ontological characterization of the sciences as discovering entities as merely 
occurrent, yet also insists upon the way “basic concepts” and an understanding of being 
that “delimit certain definite areas of a subject-matter” (SZ: 27) are ontologically 
constitutive of specific sciences. Often Heidegger takes up the case of mathematical 
physics as providing a fully general conception of nature, but also recognizes that physics 
is but one example of a scientific domain governed by an understanding of being.  
Thus, both Sellars and Heidegger make salient the question of the unity and/or 
disunity of the various sciences in their naturalist accountability to the world, and their 
accounts can complement one another. Sellars more explicitly naturalizes Kant, as we 
have seen, but Heidegger’s and Sellars’s differences over the importance of the sciences 
for philosophy emerge against their background commitments to differentiating the task 
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of philosophy from that of the sciences.13 Both of them pose this issue against the 
background of a strongly historical sense of conceptual change in the sciences and 
philosophy, and the possibility that our best current understanding will not merely be 
improved or partially modified by subsequent developments, but will be conceptually 
and methodologically reconstructed (Rouse 2016). Sellars and Heidegger thus each 
consider the prospect of an eventual completion of scientific inquiry, yet this is 
conceptualized alongside the register of a limit-concept in both cases, where any 
naturalist approach must recognize its timeliness and, thus, its limitations. Heidegger 
contends that the finalized scientific enterprise would be correct in only its own terms. 
Sellars poses a comparable concern, given that his aspiration to a ‘stereoscopic’ fusion of 
the scientific and manifest images starts from his recognition that the scientific image 
seems to accord no place whatsoever for man and the manifest image; this is furthered 
by his rejection of any accommodation of the two images via an instrumentalism that 
would subordinate the sciences to our perennial self-conception. For Sellars, the 
scientific image emerges from the manifest image, and to the extent that the manifest 
image does not survive “man himself ” does not survive, for “man is that being which 
conceives of itself in terms of the manifest image, [such that] to the extent that the 
manifest does not survive in the synoptic view man himself would not survive” (2007, 
386). As such, a common insight to Heidegger and Sellars is that observational terms are 
always taken to be “theory-laden,” as the distinction between theory and observation is 
methodological rather than ontological, insofar as theoretical concepts could in principle 
acquire observational uses. 
Here, however, one might preemptively raise the following objection: if the structures 
of experience are every bit as “theory-laden” as our metaphysical accounts, do we not 
motivate a radical skepticism, reprising the ineffable which we sought to unburden Kant 
from? For if neither experience nor the world can serve to provide “foundations” for 
philosophy, and if a transcendental deduction cannot proceed from the basis of any 
specific theory or paradigm, what resources can be deployed to avoid a relapse to 
dogmatic metaphysics? Yet to acknowledge that a theory of “experience” is the result of 
a process of conceptual and theoretical elaboration does not entail that this process must 
be, as Heidegger notes, an overextension of metaphysical-empirical thought into the pre-
representational bases of experience.  
Thus, we have returned to where we started: representationalism. Recall the theory 
of diaphanousness—the representationalist appeal to the structure of sensory experience 
 
13 Whether in terms of ontic and ontological concerns, or in terms of specialized disciplinary 
subject matters and the philosophical “eye on the whole”, respectively. 
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as revealed via introspection, where introspection constitutively involves worldly 
properties like red-ness and round-ness. Representationalists argue that introspection on 
its own suffices to show that experience must be representational (Harman 1990; Tye 
2002; Dretske 2003). On this view, some property can be ‘present’ in conscious 
phenomenology even in those cases where it is not necessarily instantiated. Red-ness and 
round-ness are thus able to constitute one’s phenomenal sensory experience even if red-
ness and round-ness are not actually brought to bear in any objects in the 
environment/world. For representationalism underscores introspection as method, such 
that it is enough for one’s mind to ‘reach out and grasp’ the property of red-ness and 
round-ness in itself, abstracting it from any environmental incarnation or contingency. 
Representationalism further holds that all qualitative mental states are exhausted as 
representational states; the representationalist’s order of explanation begins with an 
independent notion of relations of reference/denotation, which obtain between mental 
or linguistic items and objects/sets of objects in the nonmental, nonlinguistic 
environment. Accordingly, phenomenal properties are just representational properties, 
such that red-ness and round-ness are just perceptual states that represent red-and-
round-things. Representationalists think of representation as a generic relation, any 
species of which will hold between names and objects, predicates and properties/sets, 
and sentences and states of affairs. 
In response, we stake that there is no meaning without material-inferential properties 
and that mental qualities represent in a mode distinct from intentional content, while 
denying that semantic statements are “genuinely relational”, for asserting so would lead 
straight to a representationalist theory of meaning (either in the traditional Empiricist, 
ostensive-definition rendering or in the “naturalized semantics” version which treats 
reference as some kind of causal relation). To be sure, we deny diaphanousness, which 
treats (introspective) reference and denotation as providing a word-world link, while we 
prompt a naturalism where scientific language demands a deflationary 
representationalist semantics—one that takes observational reference (and not 
introspection) as a fundamental explanatory notion that is always subject to future 
revision. And, simultaneously, we hold that normative discourse, which is fundamentally 
expressive, must be treated non-representationally. Following Heidegger, we affirm that 
knowing requires that there is an internal and non-accidental relationship between the 
knower and what is known—Heidegger warns us against taking mind and world as 
“accidentally” or contingently and, correspondingly, against the mistake of holding that 
the intentional structure of comportments is something immanent in the subject (1982: 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 402 
64-65).14 While Heidegger warns us against an erroneous subjectivizing of intentionality, 
we, following Sellars, must also affirm the possibility of making explicit the structure of 
the non-conceptual by conceptual means, while refusing the fallacy according to which 
any such attempt to do so will result in a metaphysically illegitimate paralogism that 
transgresses the limits of experience. It is only through conceptual revision and 
theoretical elaboration that the structures of experience can be understood, including its 
sensory and non-conceptual aspects. The task is thus understanding how thinking 
progressively makes explicit the sensory, conceptual, and theoretical means through 
which knowing becomes realized in time. 
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